Utilitarianism: Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill

Utilitarianism: Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill
Utilitarianism associates the notion of “good” in relation to “happiness” or “pleasure,” if we can understand these words in the widest possible sense. See below for Bentham’s appeal to “pain and pleasure” as the “masters” of humankind. This view of what is “good” is referred to as “hedonism.” Hedonism is a word which some may be familiar with in a negative, pejorative sense. This is not surprising, since the idea of “hedonism” have long been used disparagingly as a charge against people who seem to seek their own pleasure, without concern for the welfare or interests of others. Concern for happiness or pleasure does not need to be taken in such a narrow way. Many religious traditions from Buddhism, Christianity (particularly the “Puritans” who immigrated to the Americas from England) and Islam, amongst others, have emphasized denial of bodily pleasure and enjoyment, preferring sacrifice of self and denial of the body as ideals, making the idea of “hedonism” as source for ethical judgment seem contradictory to many people. These religious traditions tend to portray the pursuit of pleasure as “sinful,” distracting from what they take to be more important pursuits like worshiping of a God, or preparation for death. But even many versions of these religious traditions also seek or promise some form of “happiness” or “pleasure” to those who follow their ways (though, such happiness is often supposedly found in another realm after death.)
The joys or pleasures we seek are not always the immediate product of our actions. We may in fact choose to do less than pleasant things for the sake of achieving some sought goal, which will then bring about happiness. We might consider the example of going to the dentist and getting our teeth drilled as one such activity. *(Note, I would like to contend from my own experience that if one uses local anesthesia and has a competent dentist, there shouldn’t really be pain involved.)

The following excerpt from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy adds some important, general considerations regarding the philosophy of utilitarianism:
“utilitarianism is generally held to be the view that the morally right action is the action that produces the most good. There are many ways to spell out this general claim. One thing to note is that the theory is a form of consequentialism: the right action is understood entirely in terms of consequences produced. What distinguishes utilitarianism from egoism has to do with the scope of the relevant consequences. On the utilitarian view one ought to maximize the overall good — that is, consider the good of others as well as one’s own good.
The classical utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, identified the good with pleasure, so, like Epicurus, were hedonists about value. They also held that we ought to maximize the good, that is, bring about ‘the greatest amount of good for the greatest number’.
Utilitarianism is also distinguished by impartiality and agent-neutrality. Everyone’s happiness counts the same. When one maximizes the good, it is the good impartially considered. My good counts for no more than anyone else’s good. Further, the reason I have to promote the overall good is the same reason anyone else has to so promote the good. It is not peculiar to me.”[1]

As the basis for the theory, consider also these opening declarations from Jeremy Bentham’s foundational utilitarian text, An Introduction to the Principles of Morality and Legislation:
“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light.”[2]
Mill explicitly situates his 1861 treatise on Utilitarianism in contra-distinction to Kant’s focus on intention and duty. He writes of Kant that:
“This remarkable man, whose system of thought will long remain one of the landmarks in the history of philosophical speculation, does, in [Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals], lay down a universal first principle as the origin and ground of moral obligation; it is this: ‘So act that the rule on which tough actest would admit of being adopted as a law by all rational beings.’ But when he begins to deduce from this precept any of the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All he shows is that the consequences of their universal adoption would be such that no one would choose to incur.”[4]
Certainly, we can challenge Mill’s contention about Kant’s principle allowing for “outrageously immoral rules of conduct.” (What does Mill mean by “outrageously immoral” anyhow? Is he heeding Kant’s insistence on treating each other as ends?). Putting this aside for the moment, the major claim that Mill is advancing is that all of this talk of principle and obligation must be rooted in analysis of the actual consequences of our choices. Kant claims that morality is grounded in intent, for Mill (and Bentham) it is explicitly in the outcomes of each choice that the morality must be judged. The basis for judging consequences, again, is rooted in the claims from Bentham cited above. We can judge whether the outcomes of our acts will likely produce greater pleasure, or harm, for those impacted. Yet we need to cast a wide net in considering the consequences. We cannot only look at short term effects, or the effects intended. We must also take into account other consequences of the means we employ, the likely longer-term effects, and the interests of those who may be impacted indirectly. Situational factors can be complex, and utilitarian calculus may not always be a simple matter of judging personal pleasure or pain.